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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The appellants filed their petition for interlocutory
appeal pursuant to Rule 5, R. Utah S. Ct.

This Court granted the

petition by order dated March 19, 1986 [sic]- (R. 218).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

(1)

Does the U.C.C. statute of repose, Utah Code Ann.

§70A-2-725, (1980), apply to warranty actions in which the aggrieved
party

seeks

reimbursement

for

damage

to

property

caused

by

a

defective product?
(2)
claims

If the U.C.C. statute of repose applies to warranty

for property damage, does the statute violate Article I,

Section 11, of the Utah Constitution?

(3)

Are

Davidson

Lumber

barred?

1

Sales1

non-warranty

claims

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This
Davidson

is

Lumber

Bonneville

an

indemnity/contribution

Sales,

Inc.

action

(hereinafter

Investment, Inc. and the Estate

brought

"Davidson")

by

against

of Leonard M. Sproul

(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Sproul") under theories of
breach of warranty and negligence.

Sproul brought a motion for

summary judgment in the trial court, alleging that Davidson!s claims
were barred under the terms of Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-725

(1980) .

Sproul has appealed the lower court!s interlocutory order denying
this motion.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Davidson
Bonneville

purchased

Investment,

Inc.

a

glue-laminated,
on

this beam

April

29,

wood
1976.

to Quality

beam

from

(R.184,196)

Davidson,

in turn, sold

Construction.

(R.

185,196).

Ultimately, Abrams Construction Co. incorporated the beam

in the construction of a Thrifty Drug Store in Las Vegas, Nevada.
(R. 185,196).

On October 20, 1978, the roof of the Thrifty Drug

Store collapsed, causing property damage in excess of $80,000. (R.
017,196).
On

July

26,

1983,

Davidson

filed

the

present

action

against Sproul claiming indemnity and contribution under theories of
breach of warranty and negligence. (R. 002-006).
2

Davidson settled

Thrifty Corporation's claims against it on November 16, 1983 for
$45,000. (R. 087-089).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah
1984) was a breach of contract action distinguishable from the case
here which sounds in tort.

The drafters of the Uniform Commercial

Code primarily designed the code to protect the economic expectations of contracting parties.

The U.C.C. statute of repose, Utah

Code Ann. §70A-2-725 (1980), reflects the commercial code's contract
orientation and is suitably applied only in situations where the
gist of the claim is frustration of economic expectations.
the U.C.C.

statute

of

repose to bar

Davidson's

To apply

claim would be

unconstitutional under the analysis used by this Court in Berry v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985).
If this Court ultimately determines that Davidson's breach
of warranty claim against Sproul is barred, Utah Code Ann. §7 0A-2725 (1980) does not affect the negligence claim which Davidson has
asserted against Sproul, because the two theories are independent of
one another and can be pleaded in the alternative.

ARGUMENTS

POINT I. UTAH CODE ANN. §70A-2-725 (1980) WAS
DESIGNED ONLY TO BAR COMMERCIAL CONTRACT CLAIMS
AND SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED IN CASES SUCH AS THIS
WHERE THE GRAVAMEN OF THE COMPLAINT SOUNDS IN
TORT.
A.

Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co. Is Distinguishable from
3

This Case.
Sproul relies upon Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.,
681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984) for its argument that Davidsonfs claims are
barred.

While Perry has a superficial resemblance to this case,

there is a critical difference.
Perry,

a

sub-contractor,

purchased

doors

Wholesale for installation in a medical center.

from

Pioneer

Four months after

Perry installed the doors, Perry's contractor notified Perry that
the doors were defective.

The contractor later brought an action

against Perry for breach of contract.

Nearly five years after he

was put on notice that the doors were defective, Perry brought a
claim

against

Pioneer Wholesale.

Although

couched

in terms of

indemnity, Perry essentially claimed that he had not obtained the
benefit of his bargain.

This court held that Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-

725 (1980) barred the claim.
The distinguishing feature between Perry and this case is
the nature of the damages sought.

Utah Code Ann. §7 0A-2-72 5 (1980)

applied in Perry because the statute is a contract limitation and
Perry was seeking contract damages.
not

apply

here, because

Davidson's

However, the limitation should
claims

sound

in tort.

The

confusion concerning the application of U.C.C. §2-725 to this type
of claim results from anomalies in the Uniform Commercial Code due
to the development of products liability law.
B.

The U.C.C. Reflects Early Product Liability Development.
Because early 2 0th century courts recognized the diffi-

culties encountered by injured persons attempting to prove negli4

gence in the manufacture and design of products, the courts turned
to warranty theories to alleviate the plaintiffs1 burden.

(See,

Murray, Products Liability v. Warranty Claims: Untangling the Web, 3
Journal of Law & Commerce
as Untangling the Web).

pp. 272-73 (1983) hereinafter referred to
Professor Karl Llewellyn, the father of the

Uniform Commercial Code, recognized this emerging trend and tried to
include in the embryonic commercial code a provision similar to what
is now Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A (strict products liability) .

However his fellow committee members rejected the proposal,

because they considered it more suited to tort law.

(See Wade, Tort

Liability for Products Causing Physical Injury and Article 2 of the
U.C.C. 48 Mo. L. Rev. pp 13-20.
lity").

(1983) hereinafter

"Tort Liabi-

One commentator sympathetically noted Professor Llewellynfs

predicament as follows:
In 1941, Professor Llewellyn tried to convince
the skeptics of the necessity for a direct
concept of risk allocation which would strip
away the fictions but he failed. He still had
to put together the new sales law, and he was
still faced with the case law development of
products liability under the warranty fiction.
Since he could not attack the problem directly,
he felt compelled to tack it on, to say something about it as an appendage to a commercial
code.
Therefore, he did the best patchwork he
could do.
Untangling the Web,, at 275.
(codified

as Utah

This patchwork included section 2-715

Code Ann. §70A-2-715

(1980))—a

consequential damages upon a sellerfs breach.

provision

for

Unfortunately, the

warranty fiction had some unintended results, given the enterprising
nature of defense counsel:
The warranty fiction was judicially developed,
5

first in the food and beverage cases and then in
the cosmetic cases. Eventually, the floodgates
opened and any product which caused injury could
be the subject of a strict liability claim under
the rubric of warranty.
If the courts were
willing to permit the use of this fiction to
allocate risks to entrepreneurs, the lawyers for
the defense would have their day.
With unassailable logic, they began to urge the defenses
of the fiction.
Untangling the Web, at 273.
urging

the

Such is the case here, where Sproul is

application of a contract

limitation to bar what in

essence is a tort action.
One author has specifically noted that U.C.C. §2-725 was
never designed nor intended to apply to the situation we have here:
Section 2-725 sets the period for limitation of
action at four years from the time the breach of
warranty occurs. The breach occurs "when tender
of delivery is made." This is obviously based
entirely on the concept that the product is not
in accordance with expectations so the buyer has
been damaged and has a cause of action at the
moment the article is tendered to him.
It
completely fails to provide appropriate relief
in the case of personal injury, where the cause
of action arises only when the injury occurs.
If the injured party is not the buyer, the
statute of limitations may well have run before
he even has a cause of action.
The drafters
were clearly not thinking of personal injury
cases in this section, and if it applies to them
the unjust result carries overtones of unconstitutionality. The courts have uniformly felt
that they must be resourceful to find a way
around such an "unbelievable" result. The usual
method is to find that the provision is not
intended to apply to tort actions.
Tort Liability, at 9-10.
C.

The Courts Have Properly Limited U.C.C. § 2-725 to Its Com-

mercial Context.
Courts have refused to mechanistically apply U.C.C. §2-725
6

to bar

actions

Supreme

Court

sounding

in tort.

For example, the New Jersey

in Heavner v. Uniroval, Inc., 305 A.2d

412

(N.J.

1973), held that the New Jersey analog to Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-725
(1980) did not apply to the claim of a person who had suffered
personal injury and property damage as a result of a defective tire
even though the claim was phrased in terms of warranty:
When the gravamen is a defect in the article and
consequential personal injury and property
damages are sought, they will be taken for what
they actually are, no matter how expressed.
Heavner, 305 A.2d at 427.

The California Appellate Court in Becker

v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 125 Cal. Rptr. 326 (Cal. App. 1975)
in following Heavner discussed the decision as follows:
The court held, therefore, that the statute of
limitations for tort actions and not the Code
statute of limitations governed the plaintiffs'
action for breach of warranty both against the
retailer and the manufacturer.
In so holding,
the court observed that the matter before them
was a consumer's action in strict liability in
tort.
The court pointed out that their cases
follow the view of the Restatement and Dean
Prosser, namely, that such causes of action
represent a new concept not governed by the
commercial contract thesis of the Code provisions and that one gains no advantage by
pleading them in terms of breach of warranty,
express or implied.
Finally, the Heavner court
announced its rule that, when the gravamen is a
defect in the article and consequential personal
injury and property damages are sought, they
will be taken for what they actually are, no
matter how expressed.
Becker, 125 Cai. Rptr. at 330.
In a

concurring

opinion

Machine Co. , 335 N.E.2d 275

in Victorson

v.

Bock

Laundry

(N.Y.#1975)—a decision in which the

Court of Appeals of New York overruled a prior decision which had
7

held that

§2-725 superseded

all other

statutes of limitation in

products cases—Judge Fuchsberg expressed his views as follows:
Indeed, a careful reading of section 2-725 of
the code (or the comments to it) , where the
four-y ear-from-time-of-delivery
limitation is
set out, points up the complete absence of
references to personal injury and third-party
beneficiary actions. The inference is that the
intent was to deal exclusively with commercial
transactions.
Victorson, 335 N.E.2d at 281.
Each of the cited courts recognized that U.C.C. §2-725 was
designed

to

apply

only

where

the

plaintiff

seeks

damages

for

frustration of its economic expectations—a true commercial application.

By adopting a similar approach, this court need not consider

constitutional problems otherwise engendered by broader application
of the statute.
POINT II:
TO APPLY UTAH CODE ANN. §70A-2-725
(1980) TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE WOULD VIOLATE
ARTICLE I, SECTION 11 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
In Berry v.

Beech Aircraft

Corp. , 717

P.2d

670

(Utah

1985), the heirs of an individual killed in an airplane accident
brought an action against the airplane's manufacturer.

Because the

airplane had been manufactured approximately 2 0 years prior to the
date of the accident, the Utah Product Liability Act statute of
repose,

Utah

Code

Ann.

§78-15-3

claims before they arose.

(1953),

barred

the

plaintiffs'

This court held the statute unconsti-

tutional as being a violation of Article I, Section 11 of the Utah
Constitution—the "open courts" provision.

The analysis employed in

Berry is directly applicable to the circumstances here.
8

In

Berry,

this

court

defined

a

statute

of

repose

as

follows:
A statute of repose bars all actions after a
specified period of time has run from the
occurrence of some event other than the occurrence of an injury that gives rise to a cause of
action.
Berrv. 717 P. 2d at 672.

Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-725

(1980) is a

statute of repose under the Berry criterion, because the statute
provides for a four-year period which commences not at the time that
the product causes injury but at the time the product is tendered
for delivery.
In Berry, this court held that in order to satisfy Article
I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution, the law must either (1)
allow

an

alternative

remedy

for

the

right

abrogated

which

is

substantially equal in value or comparable in substantive protection, or (2) if no substitute or alternative remedy is provided, the
abrogation of the remedy is valid only if there is a clear social or
economic evil to be eliminated and elimination of the existing legal
remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the
objective. Berry. 717 P.2d at 680.
The statute at issue abrogates all actions for breach of
warranty

after

four years

from the tender of the product.

The

statute makes no allowance for injuries occurring more than four
years after delivery or situations as here, where Davidson's right
to reimbursement did not arise until after Davidson had paid for the
property damage caused by the beam's defects.
stand

only

if there

is a clear
9

social

or

The statute can

economic

evil

to be

eliminated

and

the

elimination

of

the

legal

remedy

is not

arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the objective.

an

Utah

Code Ann. §70A-2-725 (1980) does not meet those requirements.
The rationale for this statute is found in the official
comments promulgated by the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code:
To introduce a uniform statute of limitations
for sales contracts, thus eliminating the
jurisdictional variations and providing needed
relief for concerns doing business on a nationwide scale whose contracts have heretofore been
governed by several different periods of
limitation depending upon the state in which the
transaction occurred. This Article takes sales
contracts out of the general laws limiting the
time for commencing contractual actions and
selects a four year period as the most appropriate to modern business practice. This is
within the normal commercial record keeping
period.
U.C.C.

§2-725

U.C.C.

§2-725 was

interstate

official
to

businesses

comment
establish
which

(1977).

Hence, the purpose

a uniform

ostensibly

limitation

accords

during which business records are normally kept.

with

period
the

for
for

period

Davidson asserts

that the statute is arbitrary and an unreasonable means of achieving
its goals.
Three factors considered in Berry directly apply to the
statute at issue here.
Utah

Product

Liability

First, this court in Berry considered the
Act's

statute

of

repose

to be

arbitrary

because the limitation applied to all products regardless of their
life expectancy.
725

(1980)

Berry, 717 P. 2d at 681.

is similarly

arbitrary.

Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-

It does not

differentiate

between products intended to be consumed in a very short period of
time and longer lived products such as the product at issue here—a

beam which was intended by all parties to be an integral part of a
structure expected to last for a great number of years.
Second, this court in Berry considered the Utah Product
Liability

Act to be

incapable

Berry, 717 P.2d at 681-682.

of

achieving

its avowed purpose.

Here, the primary purpose for the four-

year statute is to impose a nationally uniform limitation statute in
the interest of interstate commerce.
uniformity

only

if other

Utah citizens benefit from

states have passed

identical statutes.

However, there is already a lack of uniformity among the states—one
commentator noting that eight states have modified, repealed, or
never adopted U.C.C. §2-725.

(See Williams, The Statute of Limita-

tions, Prospective Warranties, and

Problems of Interpretation in

Article Two of the U.C.C, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 67, n.2

(1983)).

Whether this court upholds Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-725 (1980) on this
appeal or not, uniformity will not be achieved.
Third, this court in Berry noted that the Utah Product
Liability Act statute of repose was likely to provide less incentive
to manufacturers to take adequate safety measures.
at 683.

Berry, Ill

P.2d

The same consideration applies with even more force here.

If a manufacturer's warranty is limited to only four years after
tender of delivery—two years less than the Utah Product Liability
Act

statute

of

repose

provided—the

manufacturer

has

even

less

incentive than it would otherwise have to ensure the safety of its
products.
Because

Utah

Code

Ann.

§70A-2-725

(1980)

arbitrarily

limits the period of warranty regardless of the life expectancy of
11

the product, fails in its essential purpose to provide a uniform
nationwide

limitation

period,

and

limits

the

incentive

that

a

manufacturer may have to produce safe products, this Court should
declare the statute unconstitutional as a violation of Article I,
Section 11 of the Utah Constitution.
POINT III: DAVIDSONfS NEGLIGENCE CLAIM AGAINST
SPROUL IS INDEPENDENT OF AND NOT GOVERNED BY THE
PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANN. §70A-2-725 (1980).
A.

Davidson's Claim Can Be Sustained Under Alternative Theories.
In footnote 2 of its brief, Sproul claims that no matter

how Davidson terms its cause of action, the claim is one of breach
of

warranty

only.

This

contention,

however,

cannot

withstand

scrutiny.
Sproul has not stated the specific reasoning under which
it makes its assertion.

Sproul certainly cannot base its proposi-

tion on an election of remedies theory.
Procedure,

permits

a

plaintiff

to

Rule 8, Utah Rules of Civil

state

alternative

causes

of

action, and this Court in Rosander v. Larsen, 14 Utah 2d 1, 376 P.2d
146 (1962), specifically held that it is error for a court to force
such an election.

Apparently, Sproul believes that no negligence

action can lie in the circumstances present here.
this

court

in

Perry

amply

demonstrates

why

A case cited by

this

contention

is

incorrect.
In Perry, Justice Oaks noted that this court has never
accepted the blending of tort and contract concepts, citing Moorman
Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443 (111. 1982).
12

Perry, 681 P. 2d at 217-18, n.3.

Moorman illustrates the situation

when a products claim must be limited to breach of warranty only.
Moorman had purchased a tank from National.
tank

ruptured,

Moorman

claimed

damages under

After the

negligence,

strict

products liability, and breach of warranty theories for repair of
the tank and loss of its use.

The Illinois Supreme Court specifi-

cally noted that Moorman was seeking damages for economic loss which
the court defined as:
ff

[D]amages for inadequate value, costs of repair
and replacement of the defective product, or
consequent loss of profits—without any claim of
personal injury or damage to other property * *
*,f as well as "the diminution in the value of
the product because it is inferior in quality
and does not work for the general purposes for
which it was manufactured and sold."
These
definitions are consistent with the policy of
warranty law to protect expectations of suitability and quality. (Citations omitted.)
Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 449.

The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the

trial court's dismissal of the tort claims, stating:
Our conclusion that qualitative defects are best
handled by contract, rather than tort, law
applies whether the tort theory involved is
strict liability or negligence. Tort theory is
appropriately suited for personal injury or
property damage resulting from a sudden or
dangerous occurrence of the nature described
above.
The remedy for economic loss, loss
relating to a purchaser!s disappointed expectations due to deterioration, internal breakdown
or nonaccidental cause, on the other hand, lies
in contract.
Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 450.
Davidson

in

this

action

is

not

claiming

damages

for

economic loss, i.e., damages for loss of or repair of the beam.

13

Rather, Davidson is seeking damages for the property damage caused
by

the

defective

Sproul.

laminated

Accordingly,

even

beam
if

which

Davidson

Davidson!s

claim

purchased
for

from

breach

of

warranty is barred, its negligence claim is viable and governed by
the applicable limitation in Utah Code Ann. Title 78, Chapter 12
(1953) .
B.

The Four Year Tort Limitation Does Not Bar Davidson's Claim for

Negligence.
In Perry, this court stated that:
As a general rule, a cause of action for
indemnity does not arise until the liability of
the party seeking indemnity results in his
damage, either through payment of a sum clearly
owed or through the injured party's obtaining an
enforceable judgment.
As a corollary, the
statute of limitations on an indemnity action
does not begin to run until the cause of action
accrues, even though the statute of limitations
on the underlying action may have run. (Citations omitted)
Perry, 681 P.2d at 218.
Perry

because

the

Although the general rule did not apply in

U.C.C.

limitation

barred

Perry's

claim

for

economic loss, the general rule does apply to negligence actions
where

the

claim

is

for

property

damage

caused

by

a

product's

failure.
Under the general rule, Davidson's claim for indemnity did
not arise until November 16, 1983.

Accordingly this action which

was filed July 26, 198 3—approximately four months earlier than the
settlement date—could not conceivably be barred by the applicable
limitation statute.
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CONCLUSION
Sproul is proceeding under a false premise on this appeal.
Although application of Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-725

(1980) in Perry

was proper since the plaintiff there was seeking damages only for
economic loss, the statute should be limited
mercial context.

solely to its com-

If applied in situations where the gravamen of the

claim is tort, the statute is unconstitutional.

Notwithstanding the

foregoing, even if this Court concludes that Utah Code Ann. §70A-2725 (1980) bars Davidsonfs breach of warranty claim, the negligence
claim against Sproul survives in any event.

Davidson respectfully

submits

trial

that

the

Court

should

affirm

the

court's

ruling

denying Sproulfs Motion for Summary Judgment and remand this case to
the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this .3/)^

day of June, 1987.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.

By Ity (L.L ,

h

L. Rich Humprferys
M. Douglas Bayly
Attorneys for Respondent
Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc.
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1987, to the following:
Roy G. Haslam
Paul D. Veasy
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Brief

A D D E N D A

Sec. 11.

[Courts open—Redress of injuries.]

All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay;
and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which
he is a party.

App, A

70A-2-715. Buyer's incidental and consequential damages.
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include
expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation
and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially
reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection with
effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the
delay or other breach.
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include
(a)
any loss resulting from general or particular requirements
and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had
reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented
by cover or otherwise; and
(b)
injury to person or property proximately resulting from any
breach of warranty.

App. B

70A-2-725. Statute of limitations in contracts for sale.
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced
within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to
not less than one year but may not extend it.
(2)

(3)

(4)

A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the
aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where
a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods
and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should
have been discovered.
Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsection
(1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another
action for the same breach such other action may be commenced
after the expiration of the time limited and within six months after
the termination of the first action unless the termination resulted
from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or
neglect to prosecute.
This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of
limitations nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued
before this act becomes effective.

App. C

78-15-3. Statute of limitations — Application.
(1) No action shall be brought for the recovery of damages for personal
injury, death or damage to property more than six years after the date of
initial purchase for use or consumption, or ten years after the date of manufacture, of a product, where that action is based upon, or arises out of, any of
the following*
(a) breach of any implied warranties;
(b) defects in design, inspection, testing or manufacture;
(c) failure to warn;
(d) failure to properly instruct in the use of a product: or
(e) any other alleged defect or failure of whatsoever kind or nature in
relation to a product.
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of
minority or other legal disability, but shall not apply to any cause of action
where the personal injury, death or damage to property occurs withm two
years after the effective date of this act.

App.

D

Rule 5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders,
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from an interlocutory
order may be sought by any party by filing a petition for permission to appeal
from the interlocutory order with the clerk of the Supreme Court within 20
days after the entry of such order of the district court, with proof of service on
all other parties to the action.
(b) Fees and copies of petition. Petitioner shall deposit with the clerk of
the Supreme Court 7 copies of the petition, together with the filing fee for
filing a notice of appeal in the district court and the docketing fee in the
Supreme Court. If an order is issued authorizing the appeal, the clerk shall
forthwith give notice of such order by mail to the respective parties and shall
transmit a certified copy of the order, together with a copy of the petition and
filing fee to the district court where such petition and order shall be filed in
lieu of a notice of appeal. If the petition is denied, the filing fee shall be
refunded.
(c) Content of petition; answer. The petition shall contain:
(1) a statement of the facts necessary to an understanding of the controlling question of law determined by the order of the district court;
(2) a statement of the question of law and a demonstration that the
question was properly raised before the district court and ruled upon;
(3) a statement of the reasons why an immediate interlocutory appeal
should be permitted: and'
(4) a statement of the reason why the appeal may materially advance
the termination of the litigation.
The petition shall include or have annexed thereto a copy of the order of the
district court from which an appeal is sought and of any findings of fact,
conclusions of law and opinion relating thereto. Within 10 days after service
)f the petition, any other party may file an answer in opposition or concurrence. The petition and answerls) shall be submitted without oral argument
mless otherwise ordered.
(d) Grant of permission. An appeal from an interlocutory order may be
granted only if it appears that the order involves substantial rights and may
materially affect the final decision, or that a determination of the correctness
of such order before final judgment will better serve the administration and
interests of justice. The order permitting the appeal may set forth the particular issue or point of law which will be considered and may be on such terms,
including the filing of a bond for costs and damages, as the court may determine. If the petition is granted, the appeal shall be deemed to have been
docketed in the Supreme Court by the granting of the petition, and all proceedings subsequent to the granting of the petition shall be as, and within the
time required, for appeals from final judgments.

App. E

Rule 8. General rules of pleadings.
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief,
whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim,
shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to
which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms
his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments
upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state
and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of
the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a
part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true
and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends
in good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he
may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated
averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend
to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the
obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award,
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress,
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant,
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance of affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation.
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as
denied or avoided.
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency.
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No
technical forms of pleading or motions are required.
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense
alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate
counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the
pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the
alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims
or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal
or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject
to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice.

App.

F

